Locke has established by Chapter 14 that "the good of society requires that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power" because the legislators may not always be able to foresee what would be most useful for the community (344). In some instances, since "the end of government [is] the preservation of all," one should be able to mitigate the severity of certain laws if they contribute to this end. This power to act according to discretion, outside of, or even against, the law, defines the "prerogative" of the executive. In an ideal government, the prerogative is never questioned - the people trust that the executive employs discretion for the public good (345). But many governments, in their infancy, when few laws are scripted and "mistake" or "flattery" prevailed with weak princes, the prerogative is used for the advantage of the prince at the cost of the people. In these scenarios, the people must impose limitations on the executive's prerogative. So long as the end of the government is the good of the community, a limitation on the executive's discretion cannot be considered an encroachment by the people on the government, for "nobody in government can have a right tendency to any other end [than the good of the community]" (346). This prerogative even encompasses the executive's ability to assemble the parliament at that time considered most appropriate for lawmaking. But asked the question of "who shall be the judge when this power is made a right use of," Locke, as we discussed in class today, gives up this agency to the heaven above: "there can be no judge on earth" (348). With an executive power in being and a legislative whose convening depends on the executive, the appeal must come from the people. Although people cannot themselves judge the executive prerogative, they alone can appeal to heaven when the power of the executive appears vested in an end other than the public good.
Locke's description of the executive seems to include components of Machiavelli's ideal of monarchy. Although Machiavelli's monarch may act for the benefit of the entire community, both Locke and Machiavelli fail to consider the means behind it. This "how" mechanism stems from a human virtue of justice and morality. Locke theorizes that the people collectively have the right to regulate the executive power so policies are for the people, however, the ability to exercise this circumscription and judgement is more difficult to standardize in reality. As a result, this executive power seems to adopt, almost accidentally, a role of a monarch who can perform smokescreen operations, with the people only being able to approve the end result. This inherently sparks corruption even when there is a checks and balances in place by the separation of powers.
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